Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers: What Influence Did Jaspers Have on Arendt’s Concept of Judgment?

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1. Judgment and modern society

The aim of this paper is to contribute a viewpoint from which we can better understand the nature and features of the concept of judgment in Hannah Arendt’s work. To investigate Arendt’s concept of judgment is meaningful, as it lacks a decisive text about judgment by Arendt herself, though we suppose that judging makes up the last part of her long-term consideration as the incomplete third part of The Life of the Mind. This consideration on judgment presents a viewpoint from where we can look over her thought broadly.

The extent of how to think about the importance of judgment in our political life depends on how we think about the essence of political life or a political culture which views discussion and autonomic decision as the important core of its political society. Judgment works in multiple phases in human life obviously, not only in education, business, the military, and social life but also individual everyday life. In recent research, judgment performs not only in intellectual and conscious thinking, but also passionate and unconscious behavior. Arendt’s concept of political judgment may offer important guidance for a free and democratic political society.
Before and after Fukushima

The case of the March 11 disaster in Fukushima has brought up the problem that we had needed care toward the moment of judgment in modern complex society. The atomic policies after WWII in Japan were chosen in light of the condition of the need for the stabilization of an energy supply in an unstable international economic-political situation. Needless to say there were considerable opposition campaigns against the enlarging atomic policy. On the other side, proponents, such as electric power companies, embarked on a campaign to promote the construction of atomic power plant.

Once they took the step of introducing atomic power, there was no room to enact free judging on atomic power plants. The job filled every days of the trouble of the electric power company. The interests of public policy regarding atomic policy have been located in the policy category for the mitigation of the economic disparities between urban and rural areas. They have supported massive subsides to the community in which atomic plants are located. The main interest for the companies has been the point of how to resolve the problems frequently-reported from the plants all through the country. They had erased the problem consciousness until the extraordinary accident from outer circumstance to the plant systems from a major earthquake. In this way, the lack of free imagination gradually made their eyesight impaired, their image of system crisis were confined within the plant site, they could not refer the datum of a tsunami in the 9th century in the western part of the Pacific Ocean.

From the case of Fukushima we can consider there are several difficulties concerning the act of judging. The mental act of judging tends to easily retreats from the point from which it is truly needed. There would have been several times the kairos, good chance, to decide to refine the atomic policy. We could have judged the atomic problem more freely while we emancipated the work of judging from the established interests in hyper economic development. At this point, we remember what Arendt said about atomic power – we have introduced the special power which in no way occurs in the natural processes. Tatsuru Uchida stated that the atomic policies in Japan after WWII were treated as a cost and a business chance mainly – in other words, getting money. He suggests to treat atomic energy as brutal gods who demand majestic ceremonies for affiliates, so that every person and organization involved in the atomic energy would come to notice that atomic energy is the affair needing special care beyond just getting money.

Encountering the difficulty of the act of judging, we learn the importance of the question of judgment. By the knowing of the burden of thinking and judging, we tend to neglect the chance, kairos, of judging. “Thinkinglessness” is an omnipresent case in modern society.
(2) Judgment situation

At this point, it is beneficial to observe the condition and possibility of judging from an ontological or sociological viewpoint. In the perspective of judgmental situation, judgment means a mental function which does decision making in theirself freely and seeks the consent with others under the condition of which we identify the uniqueness of the situation, concerning with the individual object though we have no criteria of references. In this paper, I would ask another question concerning the judgmental situation briefly, in the relationship with others, about the social side of judgment. Especially, in modern society, organized and having complex contexts and interests, what is the predicament of judgment? To say a word, there is an inclination to transfer judgment to another human’s behavior.

Certainly we are not able to judge alone in complex society, the mental activity of thinking in general is delegated to institutions, committees, with discursive forms. In the post-metaphysical stage of reason, the subjectivity in reflexive is limited. The condition concerning reasoning is changing its domain from human mind to the communicative and legislative institutions. It is like the transition from classical virtue to modern statutes described by Hegel in *Rechtsphilosophie (The Lecture of Philosophy of Right)*. But we should notice institutionalizing of thinking, including judging and willing, does not mean to drive thinking out of a committee. Thinking is divided in roles and terms, but judging is needed in each meeting.

On the other hand, what sorts of the transfer of judging are there? The first tendency is simplification of judging, as for example, the commercialization of judging. The commercialization has the feature of changing of the character of judging. The price mechanism is endless reflection of the former judging though there may be an equilibrium of markets in a theory. There occurs the double abstraction of the judging in the marketing process, on the one hand, the abstraction of human desire and of the specs of the goods, and on the other hand, the differentiation to the former or the next judgment.

Another transfer of judgment is through imitation and repetition. Imitations are a general phenomenon in every society. Industrial societies whether in the experience of worker or labor and consumer, force to conform the fixed patterns. It lightens the load of using energy in the judgment process, joining to the majority. We need to notice that these two modes of the mind have a meaningful version in the history of the mind.

These transfers of judgment are close to the abandonment and neglect of judgment but different from it. The abandonment of judgment presents typically in the case of Adolf Eichmann rather who did not imagine the consequence of acts by himself and neglected the thinking and judging of the meaning of the situation concerning him.
The topics in this study and preceding research

In this paper we treat two research contexts. First, we define Arendt’s concept of judgment more definitely. Second, we research what were the influences from Jaspers in building her concept of judgment.

This consideration is undertaken while conscious of many preceding studies. Especially concerning Arendt’s concept of judgment I should mention the name of Elizabeth Young-Bruehl. Young-Bruehl described in her *Why Arendt Matters*, that Arendt was on the topics of judgment very conscious about Jaspers in comparison with Martin Heidegger. Arendt is described mainly of a character of open attitude to Jaspers, and one of retreat from Heidegger. Young-Bruehl suggests that Arendt was much influenced by Jaspers.

Moreover, I would note the discussion by David L. Marshall. Marshall has investigated the theme of the essence and developing process of Arendt’s concept of judgment systematically. The problem taken up in Marshall is whether Arendt’s concept of judgment is compatible or not between actor’s judgment and spectator’s one. The problem has been recognized since Ronald Beiner, in the context of the wish of some moment of practical reason in Arendt’s judgment theory. Against critiques including Richard Bernstein and Beiner, Marshall concludes that by the investigation of the process of development of Arendt’s concept of judgment, we have got to understand its meaning in the public sphere; that is, judgment enables the noticing of something new in others, the new perspective, new concept of presenting in public world, and therefore, there is compatibility of the judgment of actor and the judgment spectator in these senses.

2. The World of Appearance

(1) The world’s phenomenal nature

In the first chapter of *The Life of the Mind* vol.1, Arendt began with a new understanding of the character of the world. She named it as “the world’s phenomenal nature,” and specified the beings in the world primarily as the appearance to someone.

*In this world which we enter, appearing from a nowhere, and from which we disappear into a nowhere, Being and Appearing coincide.*

Every being on earth presupposes the others who receive their being from over there. Some apparent beings have these roots behind their visible facade. But every characteristic of beings depend on not their underside but their surfaces, for example, in the case of human beings, we find our specialties to discern the person from anyone else just in the face not in the inside. Every bowel including psychological processes seems to be the same feature if they were disclosed to human
sight.

These surfaces suppose another being of spectators who look, listen, smell and touch them. For Arendt, the world is like an ecological system where every inhabitant is mutually conscious of another resident.

*Nothing and nobody exist in this world whose very being does not presuppose a spectator. In other words, nothing that is, in its appearance, exist in the singular; everything that is meant to be perceived by somebody. No man but men inhabit this planet. Plurality is the law of the earth*\(^{17}\).

Obviously Arendt is thinking about the world where we human beings live in. But we can define that this image of beings belongs to the ontology in the meaning of that of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* belongs to the ontology on the grounds that he analyzed the human being as the only one who can consider being, in the way of asking for the meaning of being itself. We may treat this idea as Chiasm, namely the both sides of something are the subject and the object each other in the same time like a hand grip.

*The worldliness of living things means that there is no subject that is not also an object and appears as such to somebody else, who guarantees its “objective” reality*\(^{18}\).

Arendt’s interpretation of being is associated with Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the world of appearance (Schein). Nietzsche abandoned the Platonic two world theory, and abolished the hierarchy of the sensitive world and the insensitive world. Nietzsche developed this world-view to perspectivism, there are no privileged view positions for living and seeing in the world.

As is well known, it would be to say Nietzsche has many faces\(^{19}\) and is admissive of various views about who and what he is, accordingly it is another problem what is their similarity and where is Arendt’s distinctiveness in comparison with Nietzsche.

\(2\) The principles

In the case of human activities which Arendt broke down into three types, labor, work and action, how was their regulation done and set up?

Men make and elaborate tools from materials, the designs were showed by blueprint in or outside of craftworker’s brain. Namely, the sources of regulation or prompting are out of the performance. In a similar way, labor, for example, cooking is one of digestive process, washing of clothing is maintenance procedure of body temperature, men do it as if it were the outsourcings from inner organs. These two activities get their command from exterior portion.
But when men do action, their regulative and inspirational points are in it. Criteria which regulate off-key action tuning and stay on key are named “principle.” The readers of Arendt’s On Revolution, remember that she takes it as cure in the perplexity in the terms of founding of United States. She states there had nowhere the source of legitimacy of founding act.

What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own principle within itself, or, to be more precise, that beginning and principle, principium and principle, are not only related to each other, but are coeval\textsuperscript{(20)}.

After denying the possibility of the absolute authorities of the past world, the revival of Roman Republic or Jerusalem, she describes it was the principle of the founding act that is some sort of the ethos or influence from which the act of foundation received its meaning from itself and to which the act gave the follow-on action. But how could principle save the perplexion?

Only judgment can confirm the principle out of performance of action, because action and actor contain their own sights within their narrow horizons\textsuperscript{(21)}.

Moreover, if principles emerge from individuals’ acts in the appearance world as concrete ones without labels, the task to endow them the universal characters, is not the thinking but reflective judgment. Action itself has no combination to moral criteria or practical reason. It is distinguished in work for work is realized on the premise of the two-world theory, blue-print of worker and manufacture, therefore there can be introduced the practical idea and reason easily. But if the judgment finds the connection of a concrete action with a principle, at the same instant, we can evaluate the principle in term of political value, then this means judgment performs the role of moral function albeit in an indirect manner.

The principle which came to light during those fateful years when the foundations were laid —not by the strength of one architect but by the combined power of the many—was the interconnected principle of mutual promise and common deliberation\textsuperscript{(22)}.

Principle means both the beginning and a continuing to influence. Arendt remembers the common usage of the ancient Greeks “archon”\textsuperscript{(23)}. It is like in a jazz session first code regulates and permits a subsequent free performance. Action provokes next action and so on like a chain.

This lack of conceptual clarity and precision with respect to existing realities and experience has been the curse of Western history ever since, in the aftermath of the Periclean Age, the men of action and the men of thought parted company
and thinking began to emancipate itself altogether from reality, and especially from political faculty and experience.\(^{(24)}\)

(3) The republican ontology

It is decisively important of metaphor theory for the theory of world of appearance. It gives the direction of the origin of the meaning of words whether for communication or signal using and place of thinking. Including Ivor Armstrong Richards, the main stream of metaphor theory in 20th century, they have started from the point of abandon of two world theory in semantics; true original meaning and concrete figure adaptation.

Arendt’s theory of the world of appearance is “the republican version of ontology.” If it is clear that Arendt’s theory of the world of appearance is under the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche, we should take notice the more important resemblance of appearance world and republicanism. As remarked above, appearance and being coinciding is a fundamental prescription. Appearance means someone presents themselves to the others in the public realm. That means the political participation in the public context. We need to state one more point, there is established a Chiasm relationship.

One who sees is seen by others, who acts toward someone is reacted to by anyone at the same time. It was Merleau-Ponty who by the term from neurology tried to work out the problem of self-world relationship through phenomenological-ontological pass. We notice Arendt seems to access Merleau-Ponty for a moment, but there is no evidence that there was a fecund dialogue in thought between the two thinkers. Probably we suppose they seek different horizons about how to treat the breach between subject and object. In the case of Arendt it was decisively a prerequisite that there is “being in-between” which bridges and sets apart two (or many) persons in public spaces, like a table and a talking of topics.

The second resembling point between republicanism and Arendtian world theory is the sense of distance, because both do not presuppose the mass society or human-mass. Accordingly, if they, the people in their world meet in their own common place, each comes from their own different position. The dynamism of the public world is ensured by multiplicity, in Discourse, Machiavelli said that the Roman Republic’s activities depended on not only the enthusiasm for public participation, but also the multitudinous character of leadership in the republic. Later on, in the case of republicanism usefulness of multiplicity is presented in that mixed body politics could stop the circulation of body politics, instability drove from corruption since Polybios stated.

Thus Arendt enlarged her original republican view to world theory that is ontology generically. It is necessary to notice that there are huge varieties of the theory of republicanism. J. G. A. Pocock laid stress on the element of “time” for example. He
noted that republicanism (civic humanism) classical and modern had known all human virtues are in time sequence, all political regimes also in, which save the human swiftness. Then it has been the problem how to remedy or prevent from corruption which is the pursuit of self-interest, boils up in the trend of the times.

Naturally Arendt had no such problem consciousness as to corruption prevention. But I want to describe the parallel consciousness pattern between them. In fact Arendt has little interest in the time sequence phenomenon. Very tenuously, in her consideration of “where we are when we are thinking” she picked up Franz Kafka’s He, which presents the dilemmatic human condition in having to think between past and future figuratively. In the fable the upshot is concluded by his desire, which sometime he will stand the high point beyond the battle line, where no conflict no wind of time he can only regard the battle. Moreover, Arendt sharply pointed out the view of history in modern enlightenments’ progress view. As Arendt said it was the simple historical version of modern contract theory of states (natural law doctrine for state building). With these citations from Arendt, Arendt’s desire by herself would be seen through; to overcome the nature of time. It is forgetting that is the most feared for the man of action, not a injustice or an appearance of an antagonist. In the image of time in Arendt, the world gives the swiftness of (wo)men. For Arendt the republic (polis) means the place where the time transfers to the space. That the stable space is symbolized for the memories, ancient rhetoric used to the technique of memory (memoria technica). They suppose imaginary room in their brain and train to take the symbolized affair in and out of the room. Arendt told in a letter to Mary McCarthy by image of the residence rooms of special presentation about Jaspers’ The Great Philosopher. There the profile of philosophers are put not by time sequence but by the criteria beyond the time in space order.

Why does the world theory of appearance need the ability of judgment? The problem of the principle or memory has deep relationship with the new. How do we recognize the new as the new. It is not only five senses. These senses cannot grasp the entity as something, cannot name it. In this case judgment or senses communis is able to do it. Judgment is the ability to recognize the new which is not embraced by established criteria.

3. Jaspers and Arendt on judgment

(1) The characteristics of Jaspers’ philosophy and Arendt

As is well known, since Arendt turned to Jaspers for the guidance of her dissertation, both had been building intimacy over the historical events. Especially after World War II, Arendt edited and published Jaspers’ books in English-speaking countries. Arendt visited Jaspers’ home in Basel in Switzerland year after year, stayed there several days, and discussed philosophical and political problems. The extant letters which they exchanged from 1926 to 1969 are over four hundred in
total\(^{23}\), which was far more than the letters with Heidegger\(^{34}\) and shows Arendt-Jaspers communication was so close even if we allow that a part of the Arendt-Heidegger letters have been discarded for some reason. In spite of that, we would have to say that there is a weak contact point in thought between Jaspers and Arendt until Arendt found the reflective judgment and the meaning of Kant interpretation in the discourses of Jaspers. Now, we can adduce Jaspers’ philosophical characteristics at five points as follows.

(a) The interest in real political situation and intense critique of his age

Jaspers had kept alert to the social-political situation of his age from the very start, as we can understand from his close friendship with Max Weber and Jaspers’ issue of The Spiritual Situation of the Modern in 1931\(^{25}\). Soon after World War II, he lectured on The Sin and Guilt in the War (Schuldfrage) at Heidelberg University, and he cooperated to issue the monthly periodical Wandlung\(^{26}\) from 1945 to 1949. After he settled in Switzerland, he has been outspoken and published about the political problems, more concretely than before the war. He expanded the subject of freedom and the reunion in Germany, and the atom bomb. His basic tone fixed on the freedom of political action and speech. Arendt has the same line in this regard. We infer their positive attitude to politics was from their experience of the time of World War II\(^{37}\).

(b) The influence from Kant

As Arendt said that Jaspers is the only pupil of Kant in modern era, they are common in the critique for the intellect (indicate the possibility and limitation of intellect) and maintain the intention for the transcendent (God) which has no testimony by the intellect. In 1951, Arendt did not notice the relationship between the third critique and political plurality yet. She entirely focused her interest on second critique. She wrote “Kant, autotelism (Selbstzweck), what sort of consequence came out, by overlooking the area between plurality!”\(^{38}\). Arendt has continued to consider plurality.

(c) Large sight to Eastern and Western philosophy

After Hitler’s took over in 1933, many scholars exiled themselves from Heidelberg University, Jaspers hung in there though he had rejected the dissolution of marriage to his wife who was Jewish, and he was fired as Professor at Heidelberg. Nevertheless he could access various books in the study room of Heinrich Zimmer who had engaged in Indian studies, but was forced into exile from Heidelberg. As a result, Jaspers gained an insight to the oriental, especially Indian and Chinese philosophies.

But Arendt’ intellectual playground was confined within European culture though her husband Heinrich Blücher had huge interest in the world wide intellectuals, and...
her adoring poet Bertolt Brecht had the eyes for the origins for the imagination of poetry in the East Asia\textsuperscript{39}.

(d) Intense intention to transcending

There had been the vital difference between Jaspers and Arendt on the view of the world, namely the question whether we face off against the world immanently or transcendentally. For Arendt who finds the chance which comes to realization of public life, the worldliness is the condition for a human as human, by the contrast, Jaspers who ever tries to transcend the world.

They share the consciousness that he/she is out of mass, the exception (Ausnahme)\textsuperscript{40}. However, Arendt considered consistently “we can have escape from appearances to appearances,” namely, from world to world, we have no place to sublimate nor descent.

In the case of Jaspers, its transcending character, is the special feature of his philosophy, namely, he indicates the possibility of humans in the world, nevertheless finding the limitations and horizons and going beyond them. It was found in his important book Philosophy\textsuperscript{41}, it was consisting three stages, Philosophic World Orientation, Lighting for Existence and Metaphysics. After Reason and Existence in 1935, he expressed the limitation of horizon in the form of Encompassing (Das Umgreifende). It consists in our side the Encompassings and the World. More for more divided There Being (Dasein), Consciousness General (Bewußtasein Überhaupt)\textsuperscript{42}, Spirit (Geist)\textsuperscript{3}, Existence (Existenz). Consequently, only existence and transcendence are taken into account seriously. For Jaspers, philosophy is no less than that existence elucidates itself against the transcendence.

(e) Communication as reason

Truth begins with two, is the motto of Jaspers. In Jaspers, truth and reason were altered as from the substance to the communication. As explained in Encompassing’s case in the previous section, there are multi-strata structures, namely, we may communicate in the base of Dasein, in intellect, spirit and existence. Jaspers states the relation of these as the under stratum is based over one, compatible mutually, it is like Max Weber’s responsible ethics\textsuperscript{44}. But Jaspers’ emphatic point is precisely at the existential communication, for the transcending direction is grasped as one way, from lower (Dasein) to higher via the intellect and the spirit to the existence. Here is the point where Arendt criticized Jaspers’ communication as confined within the private circles or narrow relationships.

(2) The Great Philosophers

Jaspers issued The Great Philosophers\textsuperscript{45} in 1957. This was a two volume work but he had planned to issue the continuation, which had left undone eventually. Jaspers
stated the vision and project in the introduction of the book. He takes up the great thinkers on the criteria of greatness in world scale, from ancient to modern. Then he divides these philosophers into seven groups regardless of their periodical positions. Namely, the paradigmatic individuals: (Die Massgebenden); the seminal founders of philosophical thought (Die Fortzeugenden Gründer des Philosophierens); the metaphysician thinking from fountainhead (Aus dem Ursprung denkend Metaphysiker); the envisioning metaphysicians (entwerfenden Metaphysiker); innovator (auflockernden); creative system constructors (Die gebäude der schöpferischen Ordner); and other philosophers.

The problem is how did he realize the criteria of greatness. This question is concerns the judgment problem closely. Jaspers stated “it (the greatness) is the reflection of light,” metaphorically. We ask of the meaning or of being itself, but no answer from being itself. Nevertheless we may be able to catch some hint from the persons who speculate and state about being. Jaspers pays attention to the individuals with unique qualifications which illuminate the situation of human by their dynamics.

Greatness is a universality in historically invaluable with unique figure. 

Arendt has read out the trail of Jaspers’ judging here. The criteria is not extrapolated out of an inquiring but arrived at reflectively in the circle of question about the thinker’s characters and who is eligible for it. She saw through the judging activity starting from the individuals against the universal. It occurs a transformation of the time difference into co-existence in virtual space at once, as if Raphael’s The School of Athens. We come to be able to communicate with the philosophers over the ages and spaces. In this way the time sequence which is accompanied inevitably by the oblivion is stabilized to the special order which Jaspers named “spiritual kingdom (Geister Reich)” now.

Jürgen Habermas wrote in 1958 in his “The Figures of Truth,” about Jaspers’ intention in this book. Young Habermas who had belonged to the Frankfurt School still, is basing on the critique of historical materialism, however, stated also that this history of philosophy which proceeds as so (each metaphysical truths are not valid as themselves, but they would have a truth as their existential jumps), can give the password for a universal communication, opening the horizon which get the chance of solidarity for mankind, who is forced to unify despite discretely in deep way.

Jaspers had presented already the part of his idea in The Origin and Goal of the History whose themes are the character of modern age, science, bureaucracy and socialism. It belongs to the genealogy of German idealism, especially Kant as they had the common assertion that the goal in history consists in freedom of humankind.
However the most signature point in this book is the idea of the axial age before 2500 years in which some spiritual thinkers, Socrates, Prophets in Palestine, Buddha, and Confucius advocated the conversion of conscious showing the limit situation of humans. The reason for named as axial is that we in modern age are around them still.

On 1958, 28 September, Arendt delivered a lecture in Frankfurt, when Jaspers was awarded the German Peace Prize. The previous summer, she had read Kant’s Anthropology and Critique of Judgment in Palenville where her summer holiday place was. Her address focus on the character of the public sphere where Jaspers as philosopher affirm to enter (not retreat from) no less mightily than lauded his personality, “his incomparable faculty for dialogue,” “the splendid precision of his way of listening”... “above all the ability to lure what is otherwise passed over in silence into the area of discourse, to make it worth talking about.” Arendt called the public as humanitas, which is described by the concept of enlarged mentality, cited from Kant’s Critique of Judgment.

In order to explore the space of humanitas which had become his home, Jaspers needed the great philosophers... who because they have escaped from temporal limitations can become everlasting companions in the thing of the mind.

Arendt understood the difficulty tagged on the limitation of the temporality as in “the temporal pattern of handing down, following one” which is called “tradition” generally and it is helpless for us if “without Ariadone’s thread.”

In view of this, the meaning of doing by Jaspers in The Great Philosopher is that Jaspers converted the succession in the time into a spatial juxtaposition. We need the special something to resolve the enigma of the labyrinth of the temporality, it may be the knowledge which had been called prudence (phronesis). Jaspers has introduced the communication as the new tool for resolving it at the same time of the rebuilding the labyrinth to the public plaza.

4. Conclusion

After the turning point of reading The Great Philosopher in 1957 and writing the discourse on Jaspers, Arendt had been going to think about politics in terms of judgment, which Jaspers gave the example of judging in the selection and grouping of the great philosophers and introduced through Kant’s third critique. Judgment for Arendt is the ability to recognize the individual something new as new and relates it to the universal measure. We can read the idea of judgment in the lecture notes which were edited and published after her death.

As observed above, the Arendt–Jaspers relationship had been an important moment through her lifelong. But we should remember that Arendt had tried to
serve, and resigned after, as the mediator between Jaspers and Heidegger. When she was suggested for the role of addresser in 1958 from Jaspers, she hesitated to accept it with the consideration for Heidegger. We may recognize there the spiritual triangle of Arendt-Jaspers-Heidegger which has issued abundant ideals within the ex-implicit dialogues in late 20th century, which is an agenda beyond this paper.

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1) I give the tentative definition of judgment as follows, “Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the Universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, the judgment which subsumes the particular under it (even if, as transcendental judgment, it furnishes a priori, the conditions in conformity with which subsumption under that universal is alone possible) is determinant. But if only the particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the judgment is merely reflective.” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Introduction IV, translated by John H. Bernard, Dover Pubns, 2005).


4) Ulich Beck pointed out the risk in the modern society which is the part of the complex society, and of which were took as the result of human endeavors and behaviors. Ulich Beck, Schweigen der Wörter : Über Terror und Krieg, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2002.


6) The free imagination is a vital component of judgment. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, op.cit., § 35. Kant states the beautiful is a cooperation of the imagination and the intellect (Einzbildungskraft und Verstand). Moreover, the regenerative imagination (memory) is able to represent an actuality of historical affairs. Naturally it works appalling accident in the future.

One political student has remarked that it was strange that the emergency system is in the same site of the main generators after a tour of inspection at a plant which had the Mark I atomic generator, the same prototype as Fukushima.

7) The original citation is, “It is true we have reached this stage only with the nuclear discoveries, where natural forces are let loose, unchained, so to speak, and where the natural process which take place would never have existed without direct interference of...
human action.” Hannah Arendt, “The Concept of History,” in *Between Past and Future*, Viking, 1973 (1954), p.58. That comment is nowhere near judging but more than cognition. We can note that Kant said that interest-less is the condition for judging. Arendt also has written about atomic weapons that, “We Americans have developed the atomic bomb against the devil, but used it for no-devil, now we have come up against getting the devil.” in Hannah Arendt, *Denkstagebuch:1950-1973*, Piper, 2002, S.672 (1967 December).

In December 2011 the Japanese government has entered into an atomic energy agreement with several countries.

8 ) Tatsuru Uchida, *Noroino Jidai (The Age of the Anathema)*, in Japanese, Shinchosha, 2011. Uchida was a student of Levinas. This opinion was associated with the idea that there was enshrined the god of fire (Kojin; violential god) in the oven in Japanese traditional kitchen.  

9 ) I have always stated it from point of view of ontology, conscious of the hermeneutic situation of basic human being analysis by Martin Heidegger. I have stressed that in the judging moment, we are in the condition of individuality and openness which is pending. Hiroshi Murai, “Hannah Arendt ni okeru Handanryoku no Gainen (1) (The Concept of Judgment in Hannah Arendt, (1)),” in Japanese, *Seikei Hogaku*, No.42, 1996, pp.185-215, and Hiroshi Murai, “Hannah Arendt ni okeru Handanryoku no Gainen (2) (The Concept of Judgment in Hannah Arendt, (2)),” in Japanese, *Seikei Hogaku*, No.43, 1996, pp.237-281


15) Beiner pointed out the changing of Arendt’s concept of judgment in her essays in the early period to the lecture of New School in 1970, namely from judgment of having nuance of classical practical reason (phronesis, prudence) to something meaning of the life of contemplation.


17) ibid.

18) ibid.


21) This didn’t mean that she excludes the possibility that the women and men of action can get the ability of spectator, who have good sight. It is like in *Critique of Judgment*, Kant described the reflective judgment mainly to spectator, but he implicated that it would be desirable if the creator also himself obtain the ability.


23) Another source which Arendt took over about principle, was Montesquieu’s the principles of body politics. He discerned the principle from the essence of body politics. Additionally we may refer to Hegel’s conception of the principles in *Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Spirit)*, Suhrkamp, 1970(1807), and *Logic*. See Hegel, Preface, “The
principle of Science is not completion of Science” in Phenomenology of Spirit, and Tatehito Takeichi, Hegel Ronrigaku no Taikei (The System of Hegel’s Logic), in Japanese, Iwanami Shoten, 1950. We will grasp the characteristics of Arendt’s concept of principle, especially, its phenomenal one with comparison to these analogical concepts.


27) Concerning the correspondence of the world view and the view of body politics, see Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft, Luchterhand Verlag, 1966.


30) Margaret Canovan is the first person who brought up the idea that Arendt’s thought is suitable to fit into republicanism. Margaret Canovan, Political thought of Hannah Arendt, Methuen Young Books, 1977 (Japanese translation by Toshio Terajima, Miraisha, 1981).


33) The last number which was assigned on the letter in their correspondence is 433. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, eds., Hannah Arendt Karl Jaspers Correspondence, translated by Robert and Rita Kimber, Harvest Books, 1993 (Japanese translation by Kaori Oshima, Misuzu Shobo, 2004).

34) The last number which was assigned on the letter in their correspondence is 166. Ursula Lutz hrg, Hannah Arendt Martin Heidegger Briefe 1925 bis 1975, Klostermann, 1998 (Japanese translation by Kaori Oshima and Gen Kida, Misuzu Shobo, 2003).

35) We notice the critique of mass society here like in Kierkegaard’s The Critique For the Modern, (Japanese translation by Keizaburo Masuda, Chuo Koron, 2003).

36) The main contributors were Jaspers, Arendt, Brecht, Thomas Mann, Martin Buber, T. S. Eliot, W. H. Auden, Sartre, and Camus.


39) See the works of Brecht from Lao Tsu and Me Ti (classical philosopher in China).

40) This seems to be suggesting from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

42) This is associated to Kant’s intellect (Verstand).
43) This is associated to Hegel and Wilhelm Dilty.
46) Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus.
47) Plato, Augustine, Kant.
50) Abaelard, Descartes, Hume, Pascal, Lessing, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche.
51) Aristoteles, Thomas, Hegel.
52) The group of other philosophers consists in eight sub-groups: (1) in the poetry: the Greek tragedian, Dante, Shakespear, Goethe, Hoelderlin, Dostojewski; (2) in the scientific research: Kepler, Galiei, Darwin, von Baer, Einstein (natural scientific researcher), Ranke, Burkhardt, Max Weber (historic researcher); (3) Machiavelli, Morus, Locke, Montesquieu, Burke, Tocqueville (in political thought), Rousseau, Marx (in political critique as invincible utopia); (4) in the culture and literature critique: Cicero, Erasmus, Voltaire, Shaftesbury, Vico, Hamann, Herder, Schiller, Humboldt, Bacon, Bayle Schopenhaer, Heine; (5) in the lifewisdom: Epictet, Boethius, Seneca, Tschung-tse, Epikur, Lukrez, Montaigne; (6) in the practice: Echnaton, Asoka, Mark Aurel, Fridrich the Great, Francis of Assisi, Hippokrates, Paracelsus; (7) in the theology: Me-Ti, Menzius, Paulus, Tertullian, Malebranche, Berkeley; (8) in the doctrinaire of philosophy: Proklos, Scotus Eriugena, Wolff, Erdmann.
53) Karl Jaspers, Die Großen Philosophen, Bd.1, Hohe, 2007, S.29 (originally published by Piper, 1957). The Great Philosophers is published divided into several volumes and translated. There are no complete translations in the U.S or Japan.
54) ibid, S.30.
55) Later, this article was placed in Jürgen Habermas, Philosophisch - Politische Profile, Suhrkamp, 1971 (Japanese translation by Osamu Komaki, Takao Murakami, Miraisha, 1983).
56) The aporia that cut out the greats from historical contexts, the awe to the great as the conservative moment, the debauching for the non-receptive of the value of great, and the uselessness of existential truth in the critical situation.
58) More precisely there would be other pathfinders of the idea of axial age.
59) Arendt expressed feeling of some affinity for Jaspers’ The Great Philosophers. She liked that very much, and thought about that is the best in his later books. From Arendt to Mary MacCarthy, 1962.6.7.
63) *ibid.*
64) *ibid.*

**Keywords:** Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, judgment

(Hiroshi MURAI)
Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers: What Influence Did Jaspers Have on Arendt’s Concept of Judgment?

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Abstract

This paper aims to better understand the concept of judgment in the work of Hannah Arendt. To investigate Arendt’s view of judgment, I briefly begin in section 1 with a consideration of a situation which meets the conditions and the occasion demanding judgment—the case of Japanese atomic policy, which is a perfect example of a judgment situation. Next, I will examine in section 2 Arendt’s concept of the world of appearance in her The Life of the Mind which deals with the acting field of judgment, the judged object and the judging agent side-by-side. Finally, I will describe the moment from which Arendt was introduced to considering the concept of judgment via Karl Jaspers’ The Great Philosophers, after which she started to build the concept of judgment by herself.

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